Euler Equations for the Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural by Aguirregabiria, Victor & Magesan, Arvind
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Euler Equations for the Estimation of
Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural
Victor Aguirregabiria and Arvind Magesan
University of Toronto, University of Calgary
10. April 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46056/
MPRA Paper No. 46056, posted 10. April 2013 20:38 UTC
Euler Equations for the Estimation of
Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models
Victor Aguirregabiria∗
University of Toronto
Arvind Magesan∗
University of Calgary
April 8, 2013
Abstract
We derive marginal conditions of optimality (i.e., Euler equations) for a general class of
Dynamic Discrete Choice (DDC) structural models. These conditions can be used to estimate
structural parameters in these models without having to solve for or approximate value functions.
This result extends to discrete choice models the GMM-Euler equation approach proposed by
Hansen and Singleton (1982) for the estimation of dynamic continuous decision models. We first
show that DDC models can be represented as models of continuous choice where the decision
variable is a vector of choice probabilities. We then prove that the marginal conditions of
optimality and the envelope conditions required to construct Euler equations are also satisfied in
DDC models. The GMM estimation of these Euler equations avoids the curse of dimensionality
associated to the computation of value functions and the explicit integration over the space of
state variables. We present an empirical application and compare estimates using the GMM-
Euler equations method with those from maximum likelihood and two-step methods.
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1 Introduction
The estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice (DDC) structural models requires the computation of
expectations (value functions) defined as integrals or summations over the space of state variables
of the model. In most empirical applications, the range of variation of the vector of state variables
is continuous or discrete with a very large number of values. In these cases the exact solution of
expectations or value functions is an intractable problem. To deal with this dimensionality problem,
applied researchers use approximation techniques such as discretization, Monte Carlo simulation,
polynomials, sieves, neural networks, etc.1 These approximation techniques are needed not only in
full-solution estimation techniques but also in any two-step or sequential estimation method that
requires the computation of value functions.2 Replacing true expected values with approximations
introduces an approximation error, and this error induces a statistical bias in the estimation of
the parameter of interests. Though there is a rich literature on the asymptotic properties of these
simulation-based estimators,3 little is known about how to measure this approximation-induced
estimation bias for a given finite sample.4
In this context, the main contribution of this paper is in the derivation of marginal conditions of
optimality (Euler equations) for a general class DDC models. We show that these Euler equations
provide moment conditions that can be used to estimate structural parameters without solving or
approximating value functions. The estimator based on these Euler equations is not subject to
bias induced by the approximation of value functions. Our result extends to discrete choice models
the GMM-Euler equation for dynamic continuous choice models proposed in the seminal work of
Hansen and Singleton (1982). The GMM-Euler equation approach has been applied extensively to
the estimation of dynamic structural models with continuous decision variables, such as problems
of household consumption, savings, and portfolio choices, or firm investment decisions, among
others. The conventional wisdom was that this method could not be applied to discrete choice
models because, obviously, there are not marginal conditions of optimality with respect to discrete
1See Rust (1996) and the recent book by Powell (2007) for a survey of numerical approximation methods in
the solution of dynamic programming problems. See also Geweke (1996) and Geweke and Keane (2001) for excellent
surveys on integration methods in economics and econometrics with particular attention to dynamic structural models.
2The Nested Fixed Point algorithm (NFXP) (Rust, 1987, Wolpin, 1986) is a commonly used full-solution method
for the estimation of single-agent dynamic structural models. The Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) method (Aguirre-
gabiria and Mira, 2002, 2007) and the method of Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC)
(Judd and Su, 2012) are other full-solution methods. Two-step and sequential estimation methods include Condi-
tional Choice Probabilities (CCP) (Hotz and Miller, 1993), K-step Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (Aguirregabiria and
Mira, 2002, 2007), Asymptotic Least Squares (Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler, 2007), and their simulated-based
estimation versions (Hotz et al, 1995, Bajari, Benkard, and Levin, 2007).
3Lerman and Manski (1981), McFadden (1989), and Pakes and Pollard (1989) are seminal works in this literature.
See Gourieroux and Monfort (1993, 1997) Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994), and Stern (1997) for excellent surveys.
4 In empirical applications, the most common approach to measure the importance of this bias is local sensitivity
analysis. The parameter that represents the degree of accuracy of the approximation (e.g., the number of Monte Carlo
simulations, the order of the polynomial, the number of grid points) is changed marginally around a selected value and
the diﬀerent estimations are compared. This approach may have low power to detect approximation-error-induced
bias, especially when the approximation is poor and these biases can be very large.
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choice variables. In this paper, we show that we can represent the dynamic (or static) discrete
choice model as a continuous choice model where the decision variables are choice probabilities
with continuous support. Using this representation of the discrete choice model, we obtain versions
of the marginal conditions of optimality and the Envelope Theorem conditions that we need to
construct Euler equations. Just as in the Hansen-Singleton approach, these Euler equations can be
used to construct moment conditions and to estimate the structural parameters of the model by
GMM without having to evaluate/approximate value functions.
Our derivation of Euler equations for DDC models extends previous work by Hotz and Miller
(1993) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). Hotz and Miller (1993) show that for DDC models with
an optimal stopping rule structure we can obtain necessary conditions of optimality that involve a
finite (small) number of states, and that moment restrictions based on these conditions can identify
structural parameters in this class of models. Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) extend that result to
a more general class of models with an optimal stopping rule "flavor" such as renewal stopping
problems like the machine replacement model in Rust (1987). In this paper, we derive Euler
equations for a general class of DDC models with the only restrictions being that the unobservables
satisfy the conditions of additive separability in the payoﬀ function, and conditional independence
in the transition of the state variables.
We present an empirical application where we estimate a model of firm investment. We compare
estimates using the GMM-Euler equations method from those from other methods in the literature,
such as maximum likelihood and sequential estimation methods.
2 Euler equations in dynamic decision models
2.1 Dynamic decision model
Time is discrete and indexed by . Every period , an agent chooses an action  within the set of
feasible actions A that, for the moment, can be either a continuous or a discrete choice set. The
agent makes this decision to maximize his expected intertemporal payoﬀ E[P−=0  Π(+  +)],
where  ∈ (0 1) is the discount factor,  is the time horizon that can be finite or infinite, Π() is
the one-period payoﬀ function at period , and  is the vector of state variables at period . These
state variables follow a controlled Markov process, and the transition probability density function
at period  is (+1 |  ). By Bellman’s principle of optimality, the sequence of value functions
{() :  ≥ 1} can be obtained using the recursive expression:
() = max∈A
½
Π( ) + 
Z
+1(+1) (+1 |  ) +1
¾
(1)
The sequence of optimal decision rules {∗ () :  ≥ 1} are defined as the argmax in  ∈ A of the
expression within brackets in equation (1).
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Suppose that the primitives of the model {Π  } can be characterized in terms of vector of
structural parameters . The researcher has panel data for  agents (e.g., individuals, firms) overe periods of time, with information on agents’ actions and a subset of the state variables. The
estimation problem is to use these data to consistently estimate the vector of parameters . In this
section, we first describe this approach in the context of continuous-choice models, as proposed in
the seminal work by Hansen and Singleton (1982). Second, we show how a general class of discrete
choice models can be represented as continuous choice models where the decision variable is a vector
of choice probabilities. Finally, we show that it is possible to construct Euler equations using this
alternative representation of discrete choice models, and that these Euler equations can be used to
construct moment conditions and a GMM estimator of the structural parameters .
2.2 Euler equations in dynamic continuous decision models
Suppose that the decision  is a vector of continuous variables in the  dimensional Euclidean
space:  ∈ A ⊆ R . The vector of state variables  ≡ ( ) contains both exogenous () and
endogenous () variables. Exogenous state variables, , follow a stochastic process that does not
depend on the agent’s actions {}, e.g., the price of capital in a model of firm investment under the
assumption that firms are price takers in the capital market. In contrast, the evolution over time
of the endogenous state variables, , depends on the agent’s actions, e.g., the stock of capital in a
model of firm investment. More precisely, the transition probability function of the state variables
is:
 (+1 |  ) = 1 {+1 =  (  +1)}  (+1 | ) (2)
where  () is a vector-valued function that represents the transition rule of the endogenous state
variables. Because +1 is an argument of function  (), and +1 may include innovation shocks,
this structure of the transition probability allows for a stochastic transition in the endogenous state
variables. It is convenient to represent the transition probability function using the expression in
(2). The following assumption provides suﬃcient conditions for the derivation of Euler equations
in dynamic continuous decision models.
ASSUMPTION EE-Continuous. (A) The payoﬀ function Π and the transition function  () are
continuously diﬀerentiable in all their arguments. (B)  and  are both vectors in the -dimension
Euclidean space and for any value of (  +1) we have that
 (  +1)
0 = ( )
 (  +1)
0 (3)
where ( ) is a  × matrix.
For the derivation of the Euler equations, we consider the following constrained optimization
problem. We want to find the decisions rules at periods  and + 1 that maximize the one-period-
forward expected profit Π +  E(Π+1) under the constraint that the probability distribution of
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the endogenous state variables +2 conditional on  implied by the new decision rules () and
+1() is identical to that distribution under the optimal decision rules of our original DP problem,
∗ () and ∗+1(). By construction, this optimization problem depends on payoﬀs at periods  and
 + 1 only, and not on payoﬀs at  + 2 and beyond. And by definition of optimal decision rules,
we have that ∗ () and ∗+1() should be the optimal solutions to this constrained optimization
problem. For a given value of the state variables , we can represent this constrained optimization
problem as:
max
{+1}∈A2
½
Π( ) + 
Z
Π+1(+1  (  +1) +1)  (+1 | ) +1
¾
subject to:  (+1  (   +1) +1 +2) = ∗+2( +1 +2)
(4)
where  (+1  (   +1) +1 +2) represents the realization of +2 under arbitrary choice
( +1), and ∗+2( +1 +2) is a function that represents the realization of +2 under the
optimal decision rules ∗ () and ∗+1(+1), and it does not depend on ( +1). This constrained
optimization problem can be solved using the Lagrangian method. It is possible to show that the
optimal solution should satisfy the following marginal condition of optimality:5
E
µΠ
0 + 
∙Π+1
0+1 −(+1 +1)
Π+1
0+1
¸ +1
0
¶
= 0 (5)
where E() represents the expectation over the distribution of {+1 +1} conditional on ( ).
This system of equations is the Euler equations of the model.
EXAMPLE 1. Optimal consumption and portfolio choice (Hansen and Singleton, 1982). The vector
of decision variables is  = ( 1 2  ) where  represents the individual’s consumption
expenditure, and  denotes the number of shares of asset/security  that the individual holds in
his portfolio at period . The utility function depends only on consumption, i.e., Π( ) = ().
The consumer’s budget constraint establishes that  +P=1   ≤  +P=1 , where  is
labor earnings, and  is the price of asset  at time . Given that the budget constraint is satisfied
with equality, we can write the utility function as Π( ) = (− P=1 [ − −1]), and
the decision problem can be represent in terms of the decision variables (1 2  ). The
vector of exogenous state variables is  = ( 1 2  ), and the vector of endogenous
state variables consists of the individual’s asset holdings at  − 1,  = (1−1 2−1  −1).
Therefore, the transition rule of the endogenous state variables is trivial, i.e., +1 = , such that
+10 = 0, +10 = I, and the matrix ( ) is a matrix of zeros. Also, given the form
of the utility function, we have that Π = − 0()  and Π−1 =  0() . Plugging
these expression in the general formula (5), we obtain the following system of Euler equations: for
any asset  = 1 2   :
E
¡ 0()  −   0+1(+1) +1 ¢ = 0 (6)
5See section 9.5 in Stokey and Lucas (1989) and section 4 in Rust (1992).
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2.3 Random Utility Model as a continuous optimization problem
Before we consider Dynamic Discrete Choice models, in this section we describe how a static discrete
choice model can be represented as an optimization problem with continuous decision variables in
which standard marginal conditions of optimality are satisfied. Later, we apply this result in our
derivation of Euler equations in Dynamic Discrete Choice models.
Consider the following Additive Random Utility Model, ARUM (McFadden, 1978). The set of
feasible choices A is discrete and finite and it includes  + 1 choice alternatives: A = {0 1  }.
Let  ∈ A represent the agent’s choice. The payoﬀ function has the following structure:
Π( ) = () + () (7)
where () is a real valued function, and  ≡ {(0) (1)  ()} is a vector of exogenous variables
aﬀecting the agent’s payoﬀ. The vector  has a cumulative distribution function (CDF)  that
is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, strictly increasing and continuously
diﬀerentiable in all its arguments, and with finite means. The agent observes  and chooses the
action  that maximizes his payoﬀ ()+(). The optimal decision rule of this model is a function
∗() from the state space R+1 into the action space A such that: ∗() = argmax∈A {() + ()
}. By the additive separability of the ’s, this optimal decision rule can be written as follows: for
any  ∈ A,
{∗() = } iﬀ {()− () ≤ ()− () for any  6= } (8)
Given this form of the optimal decision rule, we can restrict our analysis to decision rules with
the following ‘threshold form: {() = } if and only if {()− () ≤ ()− () for any  6= },
where () is an arbitrary real valued function. We can represent decision rules within this class
using a Conditional Choice Probability (CCP) function  (), that is the decision rule integrated
over the vector of random variables , i.e.,  () ≡ R 1 {() = } () . Therefore, we have that
 () =
Z
1 {()− () ≤ ()− () for any  6= } ()
= e (()− () : for any  6= ) ,
(9)
where 1{} is the indicator function, and e is the CDF of the vector {()− () : for any  6= }.
Lemma 1 establishes that in an ARUM we can represent decision rules using a vector of CCPs
P ≡ { (1),  (2), ...,  ()} in the -dimension simplex.
LEMMA 1. [McFadden, 1981]. Consider an ARUM where the distribution of  is  that is
absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, strictly increasing and continuously diﬀer-
entiable in all its arguments. Let () be a discrete-valued function from R+1 into A = {0 1  };
let μ ≡ {(1), (2), ..., ()} be a vector in the -dimension Euclidean space; and let P ≡ { (1),
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 (2), ...,  ()} be a vector in the -dimension simplex S. We can say that (), eμ, and P
represent the same decision rule in the ARUM if and only if the following conditions hold:
() = P
=0
 1 { ()− () ≤ ()− () for any  6=  } (10)
and for any  ∈ A,
 () = e (()− () : for any  6= ) (11)
where e is the CDF of the vector {()− () : for any  6= }.
Lemma 2 establishes the invertibility of the relationship between the vector of CCPs P and the
vector of diﬀerential payoﬀs eμ.
LEMMA 2. Let eG() be the vector valued mapping { e1() e2(), ..., e()} from R into S. Under
the conditions of Lemma 1, the mapping eG() is invertible everywhere. We represent the inverse
mapping as e−1().
Given an arbitrary decision rule, represented in terms (), or μ, or P, let Π be the expected
payoﬀ before the realization of the vector  if the agent behaves according to this arbitrary decision
rule. By definition,
Π ≡
Z
{  (()) +  (()) } () = E (  (()) +  (()) ) (12)
where the expectation E() is over the distribution of . We can represent this expected payoﬀ as
a function of (), or μ, or P. For our analysis, it is most convenient to represent this expected
payoﬀ as a function of CCPs, i.e., Π(P). Given its definition, this expected payoﬀ function can be
written as:
Π(P) =
X
=0
 () { () + (P) }
= (0) + (0P) +
X
=1
 () {()− (0) + (P)− (0P)}
(13)
where (P) is defined as the expected value of () conditional on alternative  being chosen
under decision rule (). That is, (P) ≡ E (() | () = ), and as a function of P we have
that
(P) = E
³
() | ()− () ≤ e−1(P)− e−1(P) for any  6= ´ (14)
The conditions of the ARUM imply that functions (P) and Π(P) are continuously diﬀerentiable
with respect to P everywhere on the simplex S. Therefore, this expected payoﬀ function Π(P) has
a maximum on S. We can define P∗ as the vector of CCPs that maximizes this expected payoﬀ
function:
P∗ = argmax
P∈S { Π
(P) } (15)
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Then, we have two representations of the ARUM, and two apparently diﬀerent decision prob-
lems. On the one hand, we have the discrete choice model with the optimal decision rule ∗()
in equation (8) that maximizes the payoﬀ () + () where once  is realized and known to the
agent. We denote this as the ex-post decision problem to emphasize that the decision is after
the realization of  is known to the agent. Associated to ∗, we have its corresponding CCP,
that we can represent as P∗ , that is equal to eG(eπ) where eπ is the vector of diﬀerential payoﬀs
{e() ≡ () − (0) : for any  6= 0}. For econometric analysis of ARUM, we are interested
in the P∗ representation because these are CCPs from the point of view of the econometrician
(who does not observe ) describing the behavior of an agent who maximizes his payoﬀ given his
knowledge of  and . On the other hand, we have the continuous decision problem represented
by equation (15) where the agent chooses the vector of CCPs P to maximize his ex-ante expected
payoﬀ Π before the realization of . In principle, this second optimization problem is not the one
the ARUM assumes the individual is solving. In the ARUM we assume that the individual makes
his choice after observing the realization of the vector of ’s. Proposition 1 establishes that these
two optimization problems are equivalent, that the choice probabilities P∗ and P∗ are the same,
and that P∗ can be described in terms of the marginal conditions of optimality associated to the
continuous optimization problem in (15).
PROPOSITION 1. Let P∗ be the vector of CCPs associated with the optimal decision rule ∗
in the discrete decision problem (8), and let P∗ be the vector of CCPs that solves the continuous
optimization problem (15). Then, (i) the vectors P∗ and P∗ are the same; and (ii) P∗ satisfies
the marginal conditions of optimality Π(P∗) () = 0 for any   0, and the marginal expected
payoﬀ Π(P) () has the following form:
Π(P)
 () = ()− (0) + (P)− (0P) +
P
=0
 ()(P) () (16)
Proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 establishes a characterization of the optimal decision rule in terms of marginal
conditions of optimality with respect to CCPs. In section 3, we show that these conditions can
be used to construct moment conditions and a two-step estimator of the structural parameters.
Note that the marginal conditions of optimality in equation (16) are with respect to the  free
probabilities, i.e., in Π(P), the choice probability for alternative zero should be represented as
1−P=1  ().
EXAMPLE 2 (Multinomial Logit): Suppose that the unobservable variables () are iid with an
extreme value type 1 distribution. For this distribution, it is possible to show that the function
(P) has the following simple form: (P) =  − ln (), where  is Euler’s constant (see the
7
appendix to chapter 2 in Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992, for a proof of this result). Plugging
this expression into (16), we get the following marginal condition of optimality:
Π(P∗)
 () = ()− (0)− ln
∗() + ln ∗(0) = 0 (17)
because in this model, for any , the term P=0  () [(P) ()] is zero.6
EXAMPLE 3 (Binary Probit model): Suppose that the decision model is binary, A = {0 1},
and (0) and (1) are independently and identically distributed with a normal distribution with
zero mean and variance 2. Let () and Φ() denote the density and the cumulative distribution
functions for the standard normal, respectively, and let Φ−1() be the inverse function of Φ. Given
this distribution, it is possible to show that: (0  (1)) = √
2
(Φ−1[1− (1)])
1− (1) , and (1  (1)) = √2
(Φ−1[ (1)])
 (1) . Using these expressions, we have that:7
(0 (1))
 (1) =
√
2
∙
−Φ−1(1− (1))
1− (1) +
(Φ−1[ (1)])
[1− (1)]2
¸
(1 (1))
 (1) =
√
2
∙
−Φ−1( (1))
 (1) − (Φ
−1[ (1)])
 (1)2
¸ (18)
Solving these expressions into the first order condition in (16) and taking into account that by
symmetry of the Normal distribution Φ−1 (1−  (1)) = −Φ−1 ( (1)), we get the following marginal
condition of optimality:
Π(P∗)
 (1) = (1)− (0)−
√
2 Φ−1 ( (1)) = 0 (19)
2.4 Euler equations in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models
Consider the dynamic decision model in section 2.1 but suppose now that the set of feasible actions
is discrete and finite: A = {0 1  }. There are two sets of state variables:  = (x ), where
x is the vector of state variables observable to the researcher, and  represents the unobservables
for the researcher. The set of observable state variables x itself is comprised by two types of
state variables, exogenous variables  and endogenous variables . They are distinguished by the
fact that the transition probability of the endogenous variables depends on the action , while the
transition probability of the exogenous variables does not depend on . The vector of unobservables
satisfies the assumptions of additive separability (AS) and conditional independence (CI) (Rust,
1994).
6Note that

=0  () [(P) ()] is equal to  () [−1 ()] +  (0) [1 (0)] = 0.
7For the derivation of these expressions, it is useful to take into account that 0() = − () and Φ−1( ) =
1(Φ−1( )).
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Additive Separability (AS): The one-period payoﬀ function is additively separable in the unobserv-
ables: Π( ) = ( )+(), where  ≡ {() :  ∈ A} is a vector of unobservable random
variables.
Conditional Independence (CI): The transition probability (density) function of the state variables
factors as:  (+1 | , ) =  (+1 | , )  (+1), where  () is the CDF of  which is
absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, strictly increasing and continuously diﬀer-
entiable in all its arguments, and with finite means.
Under these assumptions the optimal decision rules ∗ ( ) have the following form:
{∗ ( ) = } iﬀ {()− () ≤ ( )− ( ) for any  6= } (20)
where ( ) is the conditional-choice value function that is defined as ( ) ≡ ( )+
 R+1 ¯+1(+1) (+1 |  ) +1, and ¯() is the integrated value function, ¯() ≡R
 ( ) (). Furthermore, the integrated value function satisfies the following integrated
Bellman equation:
¯() =
Z

max∈A
½
( ) + () + 
Z
¯+1(+1) (+1 |  ) +1
¾
() (21)
We can restrict our analysis to decision rules ( ) with the following "threshold" structure:
{( ) = } if and only if {() − () ≤ ( ) − ( ) for any  6= }, where ( )
is an arbitrary real valued function. As in the ARUM, we can represent decision rules using a
discrete valued function ( ), a real valued function ( ), or a probability valued function
( | ).
( | ) ≡
Z
1 {( ) = } () 
= e (( )− ( ) : for any  6= 0 )
(22)
where e has the same interpretation as in the ARUM, i.e., the CDF of the vector {() − () :
for any  6= }. Lemmas 1 and 2 from the ARUM extend to this DDC model (Proposition 1
in Hotz and Miller, 1993). In particular, at every period , there is a one-to-one relationship
between the vector of value diﬀerences eμ() ≡ {( ) − (0 ):   0} and the vector of
CCPs P() ≡ {( | ):  6= 0}. We represent this mapping as P() = e(eμ()), and the
corresponding inverse mapping as eμ() = e−1(P()).
Given an arbitrary sequence of decision rules, represented in terms  ≡ {() :  ≥ 1}, oreμ ≡ {eμ() :  ≥ 1}, or P ≡ {P() :  ≥ 1}, let   () be the expected intertemporal payoﬀ
function at period  before the realization of the vector  if the agent behaves according to this
9
arbitrary sequence of decision rules. By definition,
  () ≡ E
µ−P
=0
 [+ (+(+ +) +) + + (+(+ +))] | 
¶
= E
∙
 (( ) ) +  (( )) + 
Z
 +1 (+1) (+1|( ) )+1
¸
(23)
We denote  () as the valuation function to distinguish it from the optimal value function and to
emphasize that   () provides the valuation of any arbitrary decision rule. We are interested in
the representation of this valuation function as a function of CCPs. Therefore, we use the notation
  (PP0). Given its definition, this function can be written using the recursive formula:
  (PP0) = Π (P) + 
Z
 +1 (+1P+1P0+1)  (+1|P) (+1|) +1
(24)
where: Π (P) is the expected one-period profit P=0 ( | ) [ ( ) + (P())];
(P()) has the same definition as in the static model, i.e., it is the expected value of ()
conditional on alternative  being chosen under decision rule ( );8 and  (+1|P) is the
transition probability of the endogenous state variables  induced by the CCP function P(), i.e.,P
=0 (|) (+1| ).
The valuation function   (PP0) is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to the
choice probabilities over the simplex. Then, we can define P∗ as the sequence of CCP functions
{P∗ () :  ≥ 1,  ∈ X} such that for any ( ) the vector of CCPs P∗ () maximizes the values
  (PP0) given that future CCPs P0 are fixed at their values in P∗.
P∗ () = arg max
P()∈S
©   ¡PP∗0¢ ª (25)
As in the ARUM, we have apparently two diﬀerent optimal CCP functions. We have the CCP
functions associated with the sequence of optimal decision rules ∗ (), that we represent as {P∗ :
 ≥ 1}. And we have sequence of CCP functions {P∗ :  ≥ 1} defined in equation (25). Proposition
2 establishes that the two sequences of CCPs are the same one, and that these probabilities satisfy
the marginal conditions of optimality associated to the continuous optimization problem in (25).
PROPOSITION 2. Let {P∗ :  ≥ 1} be the sequence of CCP functions associated with the sequence
of optimal decision rules {∗ :  ≥ 1} as defined in the DDC problem (20), and let {P∗ :  ≥ 1}
be sequence of CCP functions that solves the continuous optimization problem (25). Then, for
every ( ): (i) the vectors P∗ () and P∗ () are the same; and (ii) P∗ () satisfies the marginal
conditions of optimality
  
¡P∗ P∗0¢
(|) = 0 (26)
8Therefore, we also have that (P()) is equal to E(() | ()−() ≤ −1(P())− −1(P()) for
any  6= ).
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for any   0, and the marginal value  has the following form:
 
(|) = ( P0)− (0 P0) + (P())− (0P()) +
P
=0
(|)(P())(|)
(27)
where ( P0) is the conditional-choice value function ( )+  R +1 (+1P+1P0+1)
(+1| ) +1.
Proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that we can treat the DDC model as a dynamic continuous optimization
problem where optimal choices, in the form of choice probabilities, satisfy marginal conditions
of optimality. Nevertheless, the marginal conditions of optimality in equation (27) involve value
functions. We are looking for conditions of optimality in the spirit of Euler equations that involve
only payoﬀ functions at two consecutive periods,  and +1. To obtain these conditions, we construct
a constrained optimization problem similar to the one for the derivation of Euler equations in section
2.2.
The constrained optimization problem consists of finding the CCP functions at periods  and +1
that maximize the one-period-forward expected profit Π (P())+ E[Π+1(+1P+1(+1))]
subject to the constraint that the probability distribution of the endogenous state variables +2
conditional on  implied by P and P+1 is identical to the distribution of +2 conditional on
 under the optimal CCPs of our original  periods problem, P∗ and P∗+1. By construction,
this constrained optimization problem depends on payoﬀs at periods  and + 1 only, and not on
payoﬀs at +2 and beyond. And by definition of optimality, the CCPs P∗ and P∗+1 should be the
optimal solutions to this constrained optimization problem. Given the structure of our model, the
distribution of +2 conditional on {P()P+1} can written as:
→+2(+2 | PP+1) =
Z
+1(+2 | +1P+1)  (+1 | P) (+1|) +1 (28)
where, as defined above,  (|P) is the transition probability of the endogenous state variables
 induced by the CCP function P(), i.e., P=0 (|) (+1| ).
For a given value of the state variables at period , say , we can represent this constrained
optimization problem as:
max
{P()P+1}
∆ =
½
Π (P) + 
Z
Π+1(+1P+1)  (+1|P) +1
¾
subject to: →+2(|PP+1) = →+2(|P∗ P∗+1)
(29)
where →+2(|PP+1) represents the probability distribution of +2 conditional on  = 
and induced by the CCPs P() and P+1. Suppose that the space of the vector of endogenous
state variables Y is discrete and finite. Therefore, the set of restrictions on →+2(+2|PP+1)
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in the constrained optimization problem (29) includes at most |Y|− 1 restrictions, where |Y| is the
number of points in the support set Y. Therefore, the number of Lagrange multipliers, and the
matrix that we have to invert to get these multipliers is of at most as large as |Y| − 1. In fact,
in many models, the number of Lagrange multipliers that we must solve for can be much smaller
than the dimension of the vector of endogenous state variables. This is because in many models
the transition probability of the endogenous state variable is such that, given the state variable at
period , the state variable at period  + 2 can take only a limited and small number of possible
values. We present several examples below.
Let Y+() be the set of values that the endogenous state variables can reach with positive
probability  periods in the future given that the state today is . To be precise, Y+() includes all
these possible values except one of them because we can represent the probability distribution of +
using the probabilities of each possible value except one. Let λ() = {(+2|) : +2 ∈ Y+2()}
be the |Y+2()| × 1 vector of Lagrange multipliers associated to this set of restrictions. The
Lagrangian function for this optimization problem is:
L(P()P+1) = Π (P) +  P+1Π+1(+1P+1)  (+1 | P) (+1|)
− P
+2
(+2|)
⎡
⎣X
+1
+1(+2 | +1P+1)  (+1 | P) (+1|)
⎤
⎦
(30)
Given this Lagrangian function, we can derive the first order conditions of optimality with respect
to P() and P+1 and combine these conditions to obtain Euler equations.
PROPOSITION 3. The marginal conditions for the maximization of the Lagrangian function in
(30) imply the following Euler equations. For every value of :
Π(|) + 
X
+1
h
Π+1(+1)−m(+1)0 Π
+1(+1)
P+1(+1)
i e(+1| ) (+1|) = 0 (31)
where e(+1| ) ≡ (+1| ) − (+1|0 ); Π+1(+1)P+1(+1) is a column vector
with dimension  |Y+1()| × 1 that contains the partial derivatives { Π+1(+1 +1) +1(
| +1 +1) } for every action   0 and every value +1 ∈ Y+1() that can be reach from ,
and fixed value for +1; and m(+1) is a  |Y+1()| × 1 vector such that m(+1) ≡ f+1(+1)0
[eF+1(+1)0 eF+1(+1)]−1 eF+1(+1)0, where f+1(+1) is the vector of transition probabilities
{+1(+2 | +1) : +2 ∈ Y+2()}, and eF+1(+1) is matrix with dimension  |Y+1()|×|Y+2()|
that contains the probabilities e+1(+2| +1) for every +2 ∈ Y+2(), every +1 ∈ Y+1(),
and every action   0, with fixed +1.
Proof in the Appendix.
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Proposition 3 shows that in general we can derive marginal conditional of optimality that involve
only payoﬀs and states at two consecutive periods. The derivation of this Euler equation, described
in the appendix, is based on the combination of the Lagrangian conditions L(|) = 0
and L+1(|+1) = 0. Using the second group of conditions (i.e., L+1(|+1) =
0), we can solve for the vector of Lagrange multipliers as [eF+1(+1)0 eF+1(+1)]−1 eF+1(+1)0
Π+1(+1)P+1(+1), and then we can plug this solution into the first Lagrangian conditions,
L(|) = 0. This provides the expression for the Euler equation in (31). The main com-
putational cost in the derivation of this expression comes from inverting the matrices [eF+1(+1)0eF+1(+1)]. The dimension of these matrices is |Y+2()| × |Y+2()|, where Y+2() is the set of
possible values that the endogenous state variable +2 can take given . In most applications,
the number of elements in the set Y+2() is substantially smaller that the whole number of values
in the space of the endogenous state variable, and several orders of magnitude smaller than the
dimension of the complete state space that includes the exogenous state variables. This property
implies very substantial computational savings in the estimation of the model. We now provide
some examples of models where the form of the Euler equations is particularly simple. In these
examples, we have simple closed form expressions for the Lagrange multipliers. These examples
correspond to models that are commonly estimated in applications of DDC models.
EXAMPLE 4 (Dynamic binary choice model of entry and exit). Consider a binary decision model,
A = {0 1}, where  is the indicator of being active in a market or in some particular activity. The
endogenous state variable  is the lagged value of the decision variable,  = −1, and it represents
whether the agent was active at previous period. The vector of state variables is then  = ( )
where  are exogenous state variables. Suppose that (0) and (1) are extreme value type 1
distributed with dispersion parameter . In this model, the one-period expected payoﬀ function is
Π ( ) = (0|) [ (0 ) − ln(0|)]+ (1|) [ (1 ) − ln(1|)]. The transition
of the endogenous state variable induced by the CCP is the CCP itself, i.e.,  (+1| ) =
(+1|). Therefore, we can write the ∆ function in the constrained optimization problem as:
∆ = Π ( ) +  P+1 (+1|) £(0|) Π+1(0 +1 +1) + (1|) Π+1(1 +1 +1)¤
(32)
Given , the state variable +2 can take two values, 0 or 1. Therefore, there is only one free
probability in →+2 and one restriction in the Lagrangian problem. This probability is:
→+2(1 |  P+1) =
P
+1
(+1|) [(0|)+1(1|0 +1) + (1|)+1(1|1 +1)]
(33)
Let () be the Lagrange multiplier for this restriction. For a given , the free probabilities that
enter in the Lagrangian problem are (1|), +1(1|0 +1), and +1(1|1 +1) for any possible
value of +1 in the support set Z. The first order condition for the maximization of the Lagrangian
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with respect to (1|) is
Π(1|) + 
P
+1
£Π+1(1)−Π+1(0)− () {+1(1|1 +1)− +1(1|0 +1)}¤ (+1|) = 0
(34)
The marginal condition with respect to one of the probabilities +1(1|+1) (for a given value
of +1) is:  Π
+1(0+1+1)
+1(1|0+1) = 
Π+1(1+1+1)
+1(1|1+1) = (). Substituting the marginal condition
with respect to +1(1|+1) into the marginal condition with respect to (1|) we get the Euler
equation:
Π(1|) +  E
¡ Π+1(1 +1)−Π+1(0 +1) ¢ +
 E
³
+1(1|0 +1)Π
+1(0+1+1)
+1(1|0+1) − +1(1|1 +1)
Π+1(1+1+1)
+1(1|1+1)
´
= 0
(35)
where we use E() to represent in a compact form the expectation over the distribution of (+1|).
Finally, for the logit version of this model and as shown in Example 2, the marginal expected profit
Π(1|) is equal to  (1 )−  (0 )−  (ln(1|)− ln(0|)). Taking this into
account and operating in the Euler equation, we can obtain this simpler formula for this Euler
equation: h
 (1 )−  (0 )−  ln
³(1|)
(0|)
´i
+
 E
h
 (0 1 +1)−  (0 0 +1)−  ln
³+1(0|1+1)
+1(0|1+1)
´i
= 0
(36)
EXAMPLE 5 (Machine replacement model). Consider a model where the binary choice variable
 is the indicator for a firm’s decision to replace an old machine or equipment by a new one. The
endogenous state variable  is the age of the "old" machine that takes discrete values {1 2 } and
it follows the transition rule +1 = 1+ (1− ), i.e., if the firm replaces the machine at period 
(i.e.,  = 1), then at period  + 1 it has a brand new machine with +1 = 1, otherwise the firm
continues with the old machine that at + 1 will be one period older. Given , we have that +1
can take only two values, +1 ∈ {1  + 1}. Thus, the ∆ function is:
∆ = Π () +  P+1 (+1|) £(0|) Π+1( + 1 +1) + (1|) Π+1(1 +1)¤ (37)
Given , we have that +2 can take only three values, +1 ∈ {1 2  + 1}. There are only two
free probabilities in the distribution of →+2(+2|). Without loss of generality, we use the
probabilities →+2(1|) and →+2(2|) to construct the Lagrange function. These probabilities
have the following form:
→+2(1 | ) =
P
+1
(+1|) [(0|)+1(1| + 1 +1) + (1|)+1(1|1 +1)]
→+2(2 | ) = (1|)
P
+1
(+1|) +1(0|1 +1)
(38)
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The Lagrangian function depends on the CCPs (1|), +1(1|1 +1), and +1(1| + 1 +1).
The Lagrangian optimality condition with respect to (1|) is:
Π(1|) + 
P
+1
(+1|) £Π+1(1 +1)−Π+1( + 1 +1)¤
−(1) P
+1
(+1|) [+1(1|1 +1)− +1(1| + 1 +1)]
−(2) P
+1
(+1|) +1(0|1 +1) = 0
(39)
And the Lagrangian conditions with respect to +1(1|1 +1) and +1(1| + 1 +1) are: 
Π+1(1+1)
+1(1|1+1)− (1)+ (2) = 0, and 
Π+1(+1+1)
+1(1|+1+1)− (1) = 0, respectively. We can use the sec-
ond set of conditions to solve trivially for the Lagrange multipliers, and then plug in the expression
for this multipliers in the first set of Lagrangian conditions. We obtain the Euler equation:
Π(1|) +  E
£Π+1(1 +1)−Π+1( + 1 +1)¤
+ E
h Π+1(1+1)
+1(1|1+1)+1(0|1 +1)−
Π+1(+1+1)
+1(1|+1+1)+1(0| + 1 +1)
i
= 0
(40)
Finally, taking into account that for the logit specification of the unobservables the marginal ex-
pected profit Π(1|) is equal to  (1 )−  (0 )−  [ln(1|)− ln(0|)], and op-
erating in the previous expression, it is possible to obtain the following Euler equation:h
 (1 )−  (0 )−  ln
³(1|)
(0|)
´i
+
 E
h
 (1 1 +1)−  (1  + 1 +1)−  ln
³ +1(1|1+1)
+1(1|+1+1)
´i
= 0
(41)
3 GMM estimation of Euler equations
Suppose that the researcher has panel data of  agents over e periods of time, where he observes
agents’ actions { :  = 1 2   ;  = 1 2  e}, and a subvector  of the state variables,
{ :  = 1 2   ;  = 1 2  }. The number of agents  is large, and the number of time
periods is typically short. The researcher is interested in using this sample to estimate the structural
parameters of the model, . We describe here the GMM estimation of these structural parameters
using moment restrictions from the Euler equations derived in section 2.
3.1 GMM estimation of Euler equations in continuous decision models
The GMM estimation of the structural parameters is based on the combination of the Euler equa-
tion(s) in (5), the assumption of rational expectations, and some assumptions on the unobservable
state variables. For the unobservables, this literature has considered the following type of assump-
tion.
ASSUMPTION GMM-EE continuous decision. (A) The partial derivatives of the payoﬀ function
are Π( ) = ( ) and Π( ) = ( )+ , where ( ) and ( )
15
are known functions to the researcher up to a vector of parameters , and  is a vector of unob-
servables with zero means, not serially correlated, and mean independent of ( −1 −1) such
that E(+1 | +1  ) = 0. (B) the partial derivatives of the transition rule, +10 and
+10, and the matrix ( ) do not depend on unobserved variables: i.e., +10 =
( ), +10 = ( ), and ( ) = ( ).
Under these conditions, the Euler equation implies the following orthogonality condition in
terms only of observable variables { } and structural parameters : E( (  +1 +1; ) |
) = 0, where
(  +1 +1; ) ≡ ( ; )
+  [(+1 +1; )−(+1 +1; ) (+1 +1; ) ]( ; )
(42)
The GMM estimator ˆ is defined as the value of  that minimizes the criterion function  ()0
Ω (), where () ≡ {1() 2()  −1()} is the vector of sample moments
() = 1
P
=1
() (  +1 +1; ) (43)
and () is a vector of instruments (i.e., known functions of the observable state variables at
period ).
3.2 GMM estimation of static random utility models
Consider the ARUM in section 2.3. Now, the deterministic component of the utility function
for agent  is ( ; ), where  is a vector of exogenous characteristics of agent  and of the
environment which are observable to the researcher, and  is a vector of structural parameters.
Given a random sample of  individuals with information on { }, the marginal conditions of
optimality in equation (16) can be used to construct a semiparametric two-step GMM estimator
of the structural parameters. The first step consists in the nonparametric estimation of the CCPs
 (|) ≡ Pr( =  |  = ). Let bP ≡ { b (|)} be a vector of nonparametric estimates of
CCPs for any choice alternative  and any value of  in the sample. For instance, b(|) can be
a kernel (Nadaraya-Watson) estimator of the regression between 1{ = } and . In the second
step, the vector of parameters  is estimated using the following GMM estimator:
ˆ = argmin∈Θ 
0
³
 bP´ Ω  ³ bP´ (44)
where  (P) ≡ {1(P) 2(P)  (P)} is the vector of sample moments, with
(P) = 1
P
=1

"
( ; )− (0 ; ) + (   )− (0   ) +
P
=0
 (|)( ) (|)
#
(45)
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This two-step semiparametric estimator is root-N consistent and asymptotically normal under mild
regularity conditions (see Theorems 8.1 and 8.2 in Newey and McFadden, 1994). The variance
matrix of this estimator can be estimated using the semiparametric method in Newey (1994), or as
recently shown by Ackerberg, Chen, and Hahn (2012) using a computationally simpler parametric-
like method as in Newey (1984).
3.3 GMM estimation of Euler equations in DDC models
The Euler equations that we have derived for DDC model implies the following orthogonality
conditions: E( (  +1; +1 ) |  ) = 0, where
(  +1; +1 ) ≡ Π(|) + 
h
Π+1(+1)−m(+1)0 Π
+1(+1)
P+1(+1)
i (+1|)
(+1|)
(46)
Note that this orthogonality condition comes from the Euler equation (31) in Proposition 3, but
we have made two changes. First, we have included the expectation E( | ) that replaces the
sum
P
+1 and the distribution of +1 conditional on ( ), i.e., (+1| ) (+1|). And
second, the Euler equation applies to any hypothetical choice, , at period , but in the orthogonality
condition E( (  +1; +1 ) |  ) = 0 we consider only the actual/observed choice .
Given these conditions, we can construct a consistent an asymptotically normal estimator of 
using a semiparametric two-step GMM similar to the one described above for the static model. For
simplicity, suppose that the sample includes only two periods,  and  + 1. Let bP and bP+1
be vectors with the nonparametric estimates of {(|)} and {+1(|+1)}, respectively at any
value of  and +1 observed in the sample. Note that we do not need to estimate CCPs at states
which are not observed in the sample. In the second step, the GMM estimator of  is:
ˆ = argmin∈Θ 
0
³
 bP  bP+1´ Ω  ³ bP  bP+1´ (47)
where  (PP+1) is the vector of sample moments:
 (PP+1) = 1
X
=1
( ) (  +1; +1 ) (48)
( ) is a vector of instruments, i.e., known functions of the observable decision and state
variables at period . As in the case of the static ARUM, this semiparametric two-step GMM
estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal under mild regularity conditions.
4 An Application
This section presents an application of the Euler equations - GMM method to a binary choice model
of firm investment. More specifically, we consider the problem of a dairy farmer who has to decide
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when to replace an exiting dairy cow by a new heifer. The cow replacement model that we consider
here is an example of asset or "machine" replacement model.9 We estimate this model using data on
dairy cow replacement decisions and milk production using a two step Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PML) estimator and the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator, and compare these estimates to
those of the Euler equations - GMM method.
4.1 Model
Consider a farmer that produces and sells milk using dairy cows. The farm can be conceptualized
as a plant with a fixed number of stalls , one for each dairy cow. We index time by  and stalls
by . In our model, one period of time is a lactation period of 13 months. Farmer profits at period
 is the sum of profits across the stalls, P=1Π where Π is the profit from stall  at period ,
minus the fixed cost of operating a farm with  stalls/cows, (). In this application, we take
the size of a farm, , as exogenously given. Furthermore, profits are separable across stalls and we
can view the problem as maximization of profit from an individual stall.
The farmer decides when (after which lactation period) to replace the existing cow by a new
heifer. Let  ∈ {0 1} be the indicator for this replacement decision:  = 1 means that the
existing cow is replaced at the end of the current lactation period. The profit from stall  at period
 is:
Π =
⎧
⎨
⎩
 ( )− () + (0)   = 0
 ( )− ()−(  ) + (1)   = 1
(49)
( ) is the production of milk of the cow in stall  at period , where  ∈ {1 2  max} is
the current cow’s age or lactation number, and  is a cow-stall idiosyncratic productivity.  is
the market price of milk. () is the maintenance cost that may depend on the age of the cow.
(  ) is the net cost of replacing the existing cow by a new heifer. This net cost is equal to
the market price of a new heifer,  , plus some adjustment/transaction costs, minus the market
value of the retired cow. This market value depends on the quality of the meat, and this quality
depends on the age of the retired cow but not on her milk productivity. In what follows we assume
that the prices  and  are constants and as such, do not constitute part of the vector of state
variables. So the vector of observable state variables is  = ( ) where  is the endogenous
state variable, and  =  is the vector of endogenous state variable.
The estimations that we present below are based on the following specification on the functions
() and (): () =  , and () = . That is, the maintenance cost of a cow is linear
in the cow’s age, and the replacement cost is fixed over time.10 While the productivity shock  is
9Dynamic structural models of machine replacement have been estimated before by Rust (1987), Sturm (1991),
Das (1992), Kennet (1993 and 1994), Rust and Rothwell (1995), Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999), Cho (2002),
and Kasahara (2004), among others.
10The latter may seem a strong assumption, but given that almost every cow in our sample is sold in the first few
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unobservable to the econometrician, as we show below, under some assumptions it can be recovered
by estimation of the milk production function,  =( ), where  is the amount of milk,
in liters, produced by the cow in stall  at period . The transition probability function for the
productivity shock  is:
Pr(+1| ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(+1|)   = 0
0(+1)   = 1
(50)
An important feature of this transition probability is that the productivity of a new heifer is
independent of the productivity of the retired cow. Once we have recovered , the transition
function for the productivity shock can be identified from the data. The transition rule for the cow
age is trivial: +1 = 1 + (1− ) . The unobservables (0) and (1) are assumed iid over 
and over  with type 1 extreme value distribution with dispersion parameter .
4.2 Data
The dataset comes from Miranda and Schnitkey (1995). It contains information on the replacement
decision, age and milk production of cows from five Ohio dairy farms over the period 1986-1992.
There are 2340 observations from a total of 1 103 cows: 103 cows from farmer 1, 187 cows from
farmer 2, 365 from farmer 3, 282 from farmer 4, and 166 cows from the last farmer. The data were
provided by these five farmers through the Dairy Herd Improvement Association.
Here we use the sample of cows which entered in the production process before 1987. The reason
for this selection is that for these initial cohorts we have complete lifetime histories for every cow,
while for the later cohorts we have censored durations. Our working sample consists of 357 cows
and 783 observations.
In table 1 we provide some basic descriptive statistics from our working sample. The hazard
rate for the replacement decision increases monotonically with the age of the cow. Average milk
production (per cow and period) presents an inverted-U shape patterns both with respect the
current age of the cow and with respect to the age of the cow at the moment of replacement. This
evidence is consistent with a causal eﬀect of age of milk output but also with a selection eﬀect, i.e.,
more productive cows tend to be replaced at older ages.
years of its life, the assumption may not be so strong over the range of ages observed in the data.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
(Working sample: 357 cows with complete spells)
Cow Lactation Period (Age)
1 2 3 4 5
Distribution of cows (%) by age of replacement 113 126 68 37 13
(31.7 %) (35.3 %) (19.0 %) (10.4 %) (3.6 %)
Hazard rate for the replacement decision 0.317 0.516 0.571 0.740 1.000
Mean Milk Production (thousand pounds) 1 14.90 18.13 18.76 18.42 16.85
by age (row) & age at replacement (column)
2 - 17.42 19.80 20.46 19.40
3 - - 20.06 23.74 22.28
4 - - - 20.07 21.60
5 - - - - 16.99
4.3 Estimation
In this section we estimate the structural parameters of the profit function using our Euler equations
method, as well as two more standard methods for estimation of dynamic discrete choice models,
the two-step Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PML) method and Maximum Likelihood (ML) method
for illustrative purposes.
4.3.1 Estimation of Milk Production Function
Regardless of the method we use to estimate the structural parameters in the cost functions, we
first estimate the milk production function,  = ( ), outside the dynamic programming
problem. We consider a specification for milk production that is nonparametric in age, and log-
additive in the productivity shock :
ln() =
maxP
=1
 1{ = }+  (51)
A potentially important issue in the estimation of this production function is that we expect age
 to be positively correlated with the productivity shock . Less productive cows are replaced at
early ages, and high productivity cows at later ages. Therefore, OLS estimates of  will not have a
causal interpretation, as the age of the cow  is positively correlated with unobserved productivity
. Specifically, we would expect that [|] is increasing in  as more productive cows survive
longer than less productive ones. This would tend to bias downward the ‘ at early ages and
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upward bias the ‘ at old ages.11
To overcome this endogeneity problem, we consider the following approach. First, note that if
the productivity shock were not serially correlated, there would be no endogeneity problem because
age is a predetermined variable which is not correlated with an unanticipated shock at period .
Therefore, if we can transform the production function such that the unobservable is not serially
correlated, then the unobservable in the production function will not be correlated with age. Note
that the productivity shock  is cow specific and is not transferred to another cow in the same
stall. Therefore, if the age of the cow is 1, we have that  is not correlated with 1{ = 1}. That
is,
1 = E [ ln() |  = 1] (52)
and we can estimate consistently 1 using the frequency estimator [P 1{ = 1} ln()] 
[
P
 1{ = 1}]. For ages greater than 1, we assume that  follows an AR(1) process,  = 
−1 + , where  is an iid shock. Then, we can transform the production function to obtain
the following sequence of equations. For  ≥ 2:
ln() =  ln(−1) +
P
=2
1{ = }+  (53)
where  ≡  −  −1. OLS estimation of this equation provides consistent estimates of  and
0. Finally, using these estimates and the estimator of 1, we obtain consistent estimates of  and
0. We can also iterate in this procedure to obtain Cochrane-Orcutt FGLS estimator.
Table 2 presents estimates of the production function. In column 1 we provide OLS estimates of
equation (51) in levels. Column 2 presents OLS estimates of semi-diﬀerence transformed equation
(53). And column 3, provides the estimates of the  parameters implied by the estimates in column
2, where their standard errors have been obtained using the delta method. The comparison of the
estimates in columns 1 and 3 is fully consistent with the bias we expected. In column 1 we ignore
the tendency for more productive cows to survive longer and we estimate a larger eﬀect of age on
milk production than when we do account for this in column 3. The diﬀerence is particularly large
when the cow is age 4 or 5.
11The nature of this type of bias is very similar to the one in the estimation of the eﬀect of firm-age in a production
function of manufacturing firms, or in the estimation of the eﬀect of firm-specific experience in a wage equation.
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Table 2
Estimation of Milk Production Function
(Working sample: 357 cows with complete spells)
Explanatory variables Estimates (standard errors)
Not controlling Controlling for selection
for selection  parameters  parameters
ln(−1) - 0.636 (0.048)
1{ = 1} 2.823 (0.011) - 2.823 (0.010)
1{ = 2} 2.905 (0.014) 1.068 (0.139) 2.863 (0.014)
1{ = 3} 3.047 (0.019) 1.150 (0.144) 2.971 (0.020)
1{ = 4} 3.001 (0.030) 1.004 (0.152) 2.894 (0.030)
1{ = 5} 2.809 (0.059) 0.862 (0.155) 2.702 (0.057)
R-square 0.130 0.364
Number of Observations 783 426
4.3.2 Structural Estimation of Payoﬀ Parameters
We now proceed to the estimation of the structural parameters in the maintenance cost, replacement
cost/value, and variance of , i.e., θ = {   }. We begin by deriving the Euler equations of
this model. This Euler equations correspond to the ones in the machine replacement model in
Example 5 above. That is, h
 (1  )−  (0  )−  ln
³ (1|)
 (0|)
´i
+
 E
h
 (1 1 +1)−  (1  + 1 +1)−  ln
³  (1|1+1)
 (1|+1+1)
´i
= 0
(54)
where we have imposed the restriction that the model is stationary such as the functions ()
and  () are time-invariant. Using our parameterization of the payoﬀ function, we have that
 (1  )− (0  ) = −, and  (1 1 +1)− (1  + 1 +1) = [(1 +1)− (+
1 +1)]+  , such that we can get the following simple formula for this Euler equation:
E
³
˜+1 −  +   +  e+1´ = 0 (55)
where ˜+1 ≡  [(1 +1)−(+1 +1)], and e+1 ≡ [ln (0|)+ ln (1|+1 +1)]−
[ln (1|) +  ln (1|1 +1)]. We estimate θ = {   } using a GMM estimator based on
the moment conditions E( {˜+1 −  +   +  e+1}) where the vector of instruments 
is {1, , , (1 )− ( + 1 ), ln (0|)− ln (1|), ln (1| + 1 )− ln (1|1 )}0.
Table 3 presents estimates of these structural parameters using GMM-Euler equations, and
using two other standard methods of estimation, the two-step Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PML)
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(see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002), and the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator. We use the
Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) method of Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) to obtain the ML
estimates12. For these PML and ML estimations, we discretize the state variable  in 201 values
using a uniform grid in the interval [−5b, 5b]. The two-step PML and the MLE are very similar
both in terms of point estimates and standard errors. Note that these estimators are asymptotically
equivalent (Proposition 4, Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002). However, in small samples and with
large state spaces the finite sample properties of these estimators can be very diﬀerent, and more
specifically the two-step PML can have a substantially larger small sample bias (Kasahara and
Shimotsu, 2008). In this application, it seems that the dimension of the state space is small relative
to the sample size such that the initial nonparametric estimates of CCPs are precise enough, and
the finite sample bias of the two-step PML is also small.
Table 3 presents two diﬀerent GMM estimates based on the Euler equations: a 1-step GMM
estimator where the weighting matrix is (
P
   0)−1, and 2-step GMM estimator using the
optimal weighting matrix. Both GMM estimates are substantial diﬀerent to the MLE estimates,
but the optimal GMM estimator is closer. A possible simple explanation for the diﬀerence between
the GMM-EE and the MLE estimates is that the GMM estimates is asymptotically less eﬃcient,
i.e., it is not using the optimal set of instruments. Other possible factor that may generate diﬀer-
ences between these estimates is that the GMM estimator is not invariant to normalizations. In
particular, we can get quite diﬀerent estimates of θ = {   } if we use a GMM estimator
under the normalization that the coeﬃcient of ˜+1 is equal to (i.e., using moment conditions E(
{ ˜+1 −  +   +  e+1}) = 0) and if we use a GMM estimator under the normal-
ization that the coeﬃcient of e+1 is equal to one (i.e., using moment conditions E( { (1)
˜+1 − () + () + e+1}) = 0). While the first normalization seems more ’natural’
because our parameters of interest appear linearly in the moment conditions, the second normal-
ization is ’closer’ the moment conditions implied by the likelihood equations and MLE. We plan to
explore this issue and obtain GMM-EE estimates under alternative normalizations.
12 In the context of single agent DDC models with a globally concave pseudo likelihood, the NPL operator is a
contraction such that it always converges to its unique fixed point (Kasahara and Shimotsu) and this fixed point
is the MLE (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002). In this application the NPL algorithm converged to the MLE after 7
iterations using a convergence criterion of
 − −1
  10−6.
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Table 3
Estimation of Maintenance Cost and Replacement Cost Parameters
(Working sample: 357 cows with complete spells)
Structural Parameters Estimates
Two-Step MLE GMM-Euler equation
PML 1-step 2-step (Opt. Wei. matrix)
Dispersion of unobs.  0.296 (0.035) 0.288 (0.031) 0.133 (0.042) 0.138 (0.038)
Maintenance cost  0.136 (0.029) 0.131 (0.029) 0.103 (0.035) 0.105 (0.031)
Replacement cost  0.363 (0.085) 0.342 (0.079) 0.209 (0.087) 0.241 (0.085)
Number of Observations 770 770 770 770
Pseudo R-square 0.707 0.707
The estimates of the structural parameters in Table 3 are measured in thousands of dollars.
For comparison, it is helpful to take into account that the sample mean of the annual revenue
generated by a cow’s milk production is $150 000. According to the ML estimates, the cost of
replacing a cow by a new heifer is $34 200 (i.e., 22.8% of a cow’s annual revenue), and maintenance
cost increases every lactation period by $13 100 (i.e., 8.7% of annual revenue). There is very
significant unobserved heterogeneity in the cow replacement decision, as the standard deviation of
these unobservables is equal $28 800.
Figure 1 displays the predicted probability of replacement by age of the cow (replacement
probability at age 5 is 1). The probabilities are constructed using the ML estimates. The results
suggest that at any age, replacement is less likely the more productive the cow, and that for any
given productivity older cows are more likely to be replaced. There is an especially large increase
in the probability of replacement going from age 2 to age 3.
24
Because its simplicity, this empirical application provides a helpful framework for a first look at
the estimation of DDC models using GMM-Euler equations. However, it is important to note that
the small state space also implies that this example cannot show the advantages of this estimation
method in terms of reducing the bias induced by the approximation of value functions in large
state spaces. To investigate this issue, we plan to extend this application to include two additional
continuous state variables (i.e., price of milk and the cost of a new heifer). We also plan to
implement Monte Carlo experiments.
5 Conclusions
This paper deals with the estimation of dynamic discrete choice structural models. We show that
we can represent the dynamic discrete choice model as a continuous choice model where the decision
variables are choice probabilities. Using this representation of the discrete choice model, we derive
marginal conditions of optimality (Euler equations) for a general class Dynamic Discrete Choice
structural models, and based on these conditions we show that the structural parameters in the
model can be estimated without solving or approximating value functions. This result generalizes
the GMM-Euler equation approach proposed in the seminal work of Hansen and Singleton (1982)
for the estimation of dynamic continuous decision models to the case of discrete choice models. The
main advantage of this approach, relative to other estimation methods in the literature, is that the
estimator is not subject to biases induced by the errors in the approximation of value functions.
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APPENDIX
[1] Proof of Proposition 1.
Part (i). Let Π( ) be the ex-post payoﬀ function associated with a decision rule , such that
Π( ) =P=0 1{() = } [()+ ()]. By Lemma 1, there is a one-to-one relationship between
P and . Given this relationship, we can represent the ex-post payoﬀ function associated with a
decision rule  using the following function of P:
Π(P ) ≡ P
=0
1
n
()− () ≤ e−1(P)− e−1(P) for any  6=  o [() + ()] (56)
Given that ∗ maximizes Π( ) for every possible value of , then by construction, P∗ maximizes
Π(P ) for every possible value of . The proof of this is by contradiction. Suppose that there is a
vector of CCPs P0 6= P∗ and a value 0 such that Π(P0 0)  Π(P∗  0). This implies that the
optimal decision for 0 is the action  with the largest value of e−1(P0) + 0(). But because
[ e−1(P0)− e−1(P0)] 6= [ e−1(P∗)− e−1(P∗)] = ()− (), the action that maximizese−1(P0) + 0() is diﬀerent to the action that maximizes () + (). This contradicts that
Π(P0 0)  Π(P∗  0).
Because P∗ maximizes Π(P ) for every possible value of , it should be true that P∗ max-
imizes in P the "integrated" payoﬀ function R Π(P ) (). It is straightforward to show that
this integrated payoﬀ function is the expected payoﬀ function Π(P). Therefore, P∗ maximizes
the expected payoﬀ function. By uniqueness of P∗, this implies that P∗ = P∗.
Part (ii). The expected payoﬀ function Π(P) is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to P.
Furthermore, Π(P) goes to minus infinite as any of the choice probabilities in P goes to 0 or to 1,
i.e., when P goes to the frontier of the simplex S. Therefore, the maximizer P∗ should be in the
interior of the simplex and it should satisfy the marginal conditions of optimality Π(P∗)P = 0.
Finally, given the definition of the expected payoﬀ function in equation (13), we have that:
Π(P)
 () = ()− (0) + (P)− (0P) +
X
=0
 ()(P) () (57)
[2] Proof of Proposition 2.
The proof of this Proposition is a recursive application of Proposition 1. Let(  P0) be
the ex-post value function associated with a current decision rule  and future CCPs P0, such
that
(  P0) =
X
=0
1 {( ) = } [( P0) + ()] (58)
and ( P0) is the conditional choice value ( ) +  R +1 (+1P+1(+1)P0+1)
(+1|, ) +1. By Lemma 1, there is a one-to-one relationship between P() and . Given
26
this relationship, we can represent the ex-post value function associated with a decision rule 
using the following function of P():
 ( P()P0) ≡
P
=0
1
n
()− () ≤ e−1(P())− e−1(P()) for any  6=  o
[( P0) + ()]
(59)
By definition of the optimal decision rule, givenP∗0 the decision rule ∗ maximizes(  P∗0)
for every possible value of . Then, as in Proposition 1, we have that by construction, P∗ ()
maximizes  ( P()P0) for every possible value of . This implies that P∗ () also
maximizes the "integrated" value function
R  ( P()P0) (). But this integrated
value function is equal to the expected value function   (P(),P0). Therefore, P∗ ()
maximizes the expected value function   (P(),P0). By uniqueness of P∗ (), this implies
that P∗ () = P∗ ().
The expected value function   (P(),P0) is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to
P(). The maximizer   (P(),P0) with respect to P() should be in the interior of the
simplex and it should satisfy the marginal conditions of optimality  
¡P∗ (),P∗0¢ P∗ () =
0. Given the definition of the expected value function, we have that:
 
(|) = ( P0)− (0 P0) + (P)− (0P) +
P
=0
(|)(P)(|)
(60)
[3] Proof of Proposition 3.
For the derivation of the expressions below for the Lagrangian conditions, note that, by definition
of  (+1|), we have that  (+1|)(|) = e(+1| ) ≡ (+1| )− (+1|0 ).
For any   0, the Lagrange condition L(|) = 0 implies that:
Π
(|) + 
X
+1
Π+1(+1) e(+1| ) (+1|)
− X
+2∈Y+2()
(+2 )
⎡
⎣X
+1
+1(+2 | +1) e(+1| ) (+1|)
⎤
⎦ = 0
(61)
We can also represent this expression as
Π
(|) + 
X
+1
∙
Π+1(+1)− f+1(+1)0λ()
¸ e(+1| ) (+1|) = 0 (62)
where λ() is the vector with dimension |Y+2()|×1 with the Lagrange multipliers {(+2 ) :
+2 ∈ Y+2()}, and f+1(|+1) is the vector of transition probabilities {+1(+2 | +1) : +2 ∈
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Y+2()}. Similarly, for any   0 and any +1 ∈ X , the Lagrange condition L+1(|+1) = 0
implies that
 Π
+1(+1)
+1(|+1) −
X
+2∈Y+2()
(+2 ) e+1(+2| +1) = 0 (63)
We can represent this system of equations in vector form as:
eF+1(+1) λ() = Π+1(+1)P+1(+1) (64)
λ() is the vector of Lagrange multipliers defined above. Π+1(+1)P+1(+1) is a column
vector with dimension  |Y+1()| × 1 that contains the partial derivatives { Π+1(+1 +1) 
+1( | +1 +1) } for every action   0 and every value +1 ∈ Y+1() that can be reach
from , and fixed value for +1. And eF+1(+1) is matrix with dimension  |Y+1()| × |Y+2()|
that contains the probabilities e+1(+2| +1) for every +2 ∈ Y+2(), every +1 ∈ Y+1(),
and every action   0, with fixed +1. In general, the matrix eF+1(+1) is full-column rank for
any value of +1. Therefore, for any value of +1, the square matrix eF+1(+1)0 eF+1(+1) is
non-singular and we can solve for the Lagrange multipliers as:
λ()
 =
heF+1(+1)0 eF+1(+1)i−1 ∙eF+1(+1)0 Π+1(+1)P+1(+1)
¸
(65)
Solving this expression for the Lagrange multipliers into equation (62), we get the following Euler
equation
Π
(|) + 
X
+1
∙
Π+1(+1)−m(+1)0Π
+1(+1)
P+1(+1)
¸ e(+1| ) (+1|) = 0 (66)
wherem(+1) is a  |Y+1()|×1 vector such thatm(+1)0 = f+1(+1)0 [eF+1(+1)0 eF+1(+1)]−1eF+1(+1)0, and Π+1(+1)P+1(+1) is the vector of partial derivatives defined above.
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